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REWRITING BROWN, RESURRECTING PLESSY 
JAMES E. FLEMING* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor and a pleasure to ponder Cooper v. Aaron1 and the legacy of 
Brown v. Board of Education2 in general and to respond to David A. Strauss’s 
wise and insightful Childress Lecture3 in particular.  I want to address three 
topics.  The first two are encapsulated in my title: Rewriting Brown, 
Resurrecting Plessy.  I’ll examine the widespread phenomenon of “rewriting 
Brown.”  And I’ll document what I shall call “resurrecting Plessy”: the 
phenomenon, evident in both liberal and conservative scholarship and 
opinions, of charging one’s opponents with repeating the mistakes of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.4  I’ll illustrate the liberal version by charging Justice Clarence 
Thomas with resurrecting Plessy.5  Then I’ll demonstrate the conservative 
version by showing how Thomas charges Justice Stephen Breyer with 
resurrecting Plessy.6  My third topic will be Cooper in relation to Strauss’s 
well-known theory of common law constitutional interpretation.7  I’ll argue 
that such a theory needs a clearer distinction than he has provided between the 
Constitution itself and what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitution 
in order to be able to criticize Plessy as wrongly decided and to justify Brown 
as rightly decided. 
 
* The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law and Professor of Law, Boston 
University School of Law.  I prepared this Article for the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture 
& Conference, Cooper v. Aaron: Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, held at Saint Louis 
University School of Law, October 5, 2007.  I want to thank Professor Joel K. Goldstein and the 
editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their warm hospitality on that occasion. 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065 
(2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Little Rock]. 
 4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 32–42, 50–62. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 48–49. 
 7. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law]. 
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I.  WHAT BROWN SAID OR SHOULD HAVE SAID: REWRITING BROWN 
As Strauss observes, Brown is an icon, a fixed point.8  No candidate for the 
Supreme Court who expresses doubts about the lawfulness of Brown stands a 
chance of being confirmed.  No theory of constitutional interpretation that 
cannot justify Brown is publicly acceptable.  This iconic status of Brown has 
generated an entire industry of scholarship: that of “rewriting Brown.”  We all 
know the general cast of this scholarship.  The critic begins by saying: “I 
believe Brown was rightly decided.  But I am critical of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s opinion in the case.  Here is how I would have written the opinion.”  
The critic then proceeds to justify Brown in terms of the theory of 
constitutional interpretation, or the conception of the Equal Protection Clause, 
she or he finds most cogent. 
This type of scholarship is epitomized in Jack Balkin’s book, What Brown 
v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts 
Rewrite America’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision.9  When Balkin was 
preparing this book, I said to him, “Jack, you should invite me to contribute to 
your book on rewriting Brown.”  I continued: “For my chapter, I would 
contribute, word for word, the opinion of Chief Justice Earl Warren in Brown.”  
I explained: “Despite all of the criticism of the opinion, it contains every 
argument one needs to justify Brown.”  Balkin declined to invite me, but he did 
laugh and reply: “It’s been tried.” 
Why would I have contributed, word for word, the opinion of Chief Justice 
Warren in Brown instead of rewriting it?  What arguments does it contain that 
are sufficient?  Here I would emphasize three points, echoing Strauss’s 
analysis in many respects.  One, Warren articulates a powerful conception of 
the harm of segregation in terms of an anti-caste principle of equal protection: 
“To separate [black school children] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”10  Therefore, Warren concludes, “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”11  That is the principle we need 
to justify Brown.  To be sure, Warren does articulate arguments that emphasize 
the significance of education in preparing children for the responsibilities of 
citizenship,12 arguments that do not apply to segregation in bathrooms, 
drinking fountains, marriage, and the like.  Nonetheless, his opinion rests upon 
 
 8. Strauss, Little Rock, supra note 3, at 1. 
 9. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 
2001). 
 10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 11. Id. at 495. 
 12. Id. at 493. 
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an abstract anti-caste principle that condemns segregation in all of these 
contexts.  Two, relatedly, Warren rejects Plessy’s doctrine of “separate but 
equal” because he rejects Plessy’s view of the world, its view that the regime 
of “separate but equal” did not harm blacks.13 
Third, Warren’s conception of what violates the Constitution is a state of 
affairs in the world, a practice that denies black school children the opportunity 
of an equal education.  It is not a state of mind in government, e.g., an intent of 
particular governmental actors to discriminate or an attitude of race-
consciousness as such.  Beginning with Milliken v. Bradley14 and Washington 
v. Davis15 and continuing to the present, the Court has taken a different course.  
The upshot is that we have been saddled with a “de facto” version of “separate 
but equal” for our time.16  Warren’s opinion, by contrast, entails that 
government has an affirmative obligation to secure a state of affairs in the 
world that would afford equal education and equal citizenship for all.17 
II.  THE CONSERVATIVE REWRITING OF BROWN 
Clarence Thomas has contributed to this industry of rewriting Brown, both 
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court and recently in his concurrence 
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.18  
In a series of speeches in 1987, during the celebration of the bicentennial of the 
framing of the Constitution, he criticized Warren’s opinion in Brown for 
improperly making “sensitivity” or “the feeling of inferiority” rather than 
“[j]ustice and conformity to the Constitution” the paramount issue in race 
relations and constitutional interpretation.19  Thomas also suggested that the 
 
 13. Id. at 494–95; see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 89–90, 135–39, 156–58, 167–69 (2007). 
 14. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 
418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 15. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 16. Cf. Paul R. Dimond, Panel II: Concluding Remarks, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 63 (1992) 
(“In its own way, Milliken can best be understood as a ‘separate but equal’ result for our times.”).  
Dimond explains: 
  First, in considering the meaning of Milliken, it seems to me that the public message 
of Milliken I and Milliken II, in combination, is that racial segregation in metropolitan 
America is innocent once you get beyond the inner-city boundary: it’s no one’s fault and 
no one’s responsibility. At the same time, the Burger Court bent over backwards to permit 
an order against a state authority to infuse funds into an inner-city school district proven 
guilty of de jure segregation. 
Id. 
 17. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003). 
 18. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 19. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of 
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 990 (1987). 
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opinion fostered an attitude of dependence, victimhood, and entitlement.20  To 
the contrary, I would argue, the Court’s statement about “feelings of inferiority 
as to their status in the community” expresses an anti-caste principle, a 
principle of justice that condemns racial classifications that undermine African 
Americans’ status as equal citizens by reducing them to or maintaining them in 
the status of an inferior or subordinate caste.  In any event, Thomas argued that 
Warren should have written an opinion invoking a conception of the color-
blind Constitution.21 
For some time now, debate about the interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause has been a clash between two competing understandings: an anti-caste 
principle versus a principle of racial neutrality (or color-blind Constitution).  
To state the clash simply, on the anti-caste interpretation, the Equal Protection 
Clause condemns only racial classifications that reduce African Americans to 
the status of an inferior race or caste (or maintain them in that status), whereas 
on the racial neutrality interpretation, it condemns racial classifications as 
such, whether unquestionably invidious or ostensibly benign.  This debate has 
played out most dramatically in the context of affirmative action, with the 
defenders of affirmative action programs interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause as manifesting an anti-caste principle,22 and the critics of those 
programs arguing that the Clause embodies a principle of racial neutrality or 
color blindness.23  Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia have been the leading 
champions of the latter view.24 
Notably, for a time, the proponents of the color-blind Constitution put 
Brown to one side (perhaps implicitly acknowledging that it speaks the 
language of the anti-caste principle).  They also put original understanding of 
the Equal Protection Clause to one side (perhaps implicitly acknowledging, as 
Justices Brennan and Marshall argued,25 that the Congress that proposed the 
Fourteenth Amendment also afforded race-conscious relief to newly-freed 
 
 20. See id. at 991. 
 21. Id. at 992–95. 
 22. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243–45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part); id. at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 23. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240–41 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
 24. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J. concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at 
520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 25. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
for the Court); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396–98 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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slaves and, therefore, the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was 
not to ban programs like affirmative action).  Instead, despite their professed 
originalism, Thomas and Scalia argued for the color-blind Constitution as a 
matter of abstract principle, justice, and wisdom, not original meaning.  And 
they appropriated Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy for their principle of color 
blindness.26 
But Harlan’s dissent warrants further analysis.  To be sure, Harlan did 
write: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens.”27  This is the passage Thomas and Scalia love to quote.  But 
Harlan also wrote, in the same paragraph: “in view of the Constitution, in the 
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens.  There is no caste here.”28 
I would interpret Harlan’s dissent as a whole as expressing an anti-caste 
principle.  For one thing, I would read the forbidden “classes among citizens” 
to refer to “castes among citizens,” not to “classifications among citizens.”  For 
another, Plessy itself pointedly rejects an anti-caste principle (and Harlan 
famously criticizes it for doing so).  The Plessy majority writes: “We consider 
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority.”29  The Court continues: “If this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put 
that construction upon it.”30  That is, that’s their problem: they’ve got an 
inferiority complex.  Harlan famously retorts that everyone knows that “the 
real meaning” of the law is to affix a “badge of servitude” or to put “the brand 
of servitude and degradation” upon “colored citizens” as being “so inferior and 
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by 
white citizens.”31  There is no more articulate expression of an anti-caste 
principle anywhere.  Harlan is not saying, pace Thomas and Scalia, that the 
real flaw in the law is that it reflects race-consciousness as such. 
Strikingly, Thomas’s concurrence in Adarand and dissent in Grutter reflect 
the Plessy worldview.  (You see, here is the part where I, a liberal, charge the 
conservative Thomas with resurrecting Plessy.)  One, Plessy had expressed the 
view that: “Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts . . . , and the 
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present 
situation.”  It continued: “If one race be inferior to the other socially, the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 551 (opinion of the Court). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 560, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”32  
Similarly, Thomas writes in concurrence in Adarand: “Government cannot 
make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before 
the law.”33  Furthermore, Thomas clearly believes that governmental attempts 
to “make us equal” through affirmative action programs have accentuated the 
difficulties of race relations in America.34 
Second, and relatedly, Plessy, like Lochner v. New York,35 bespoke a 
strong anti-paternalism and a conception of natural social ordering (analogous 
to Lochner’s conception of natural market ordering) that government should 
not upset and in any event could not overcome.36  Similarly, Thomas’s 
concurrence in Adarand expresses the view that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids “racial paternalism.”37  He further develops this view in dissent in 
Grutter, invoking Frederick Douglass’s plea to “[d]o nothing with us!”  
Douglass explains: “[I]f the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him 
fall . . . .  All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs!  Let him 
alone! . . .  [Y]our interference is doing him positive injury.”38 
Finally, at the same time that Thomas rejects the anti-caste principle in 
favor of a principle of color blindness, he subverts the anti-caste principle to 
condemn affirmative action programs.  First of all, whereas Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Adarand argues for strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs 
because it is hard to tell the difference between “benign” classifications and 
invidious ones,39 Thomas’s concurrence goes so far as to argue that ostensibly 
“benign” classifications are invidious.  He writes, “I believe that there is a 
‘moral [and] constitutional equivalence’ between laws designed to subjugate a 
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster 
some current notion of equality.”40  Second, Thomas argues that affirmative 
action programs, far from being benign, “stamp minorities with a badge of 
inferiority” and “may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an 
attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”41  Here, he is appropriating a 
 
 32. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52 (opinion of the Court). 
 33. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 34. See id. at 241. 
 35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 36. For analysis of Lochner along these lines, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION 45–51 (1993).   Sunstein’s analysis of Plessy suggests this analogy between the 
two cases.  See id. at 42–45, 56, 64–67. 
 37. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 38. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 39. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225–26, 228–29. 
 40. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 41. Id. at 241. 
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version of the anti-caste principle to condemn affirmative action programs.  He 
adds that such programs stoke the resentment of non-African Americans.42  We 
should observe that Thomas, despite his criticism of Brown for emphasizing 
“feelings” or “sensitivity,” is here emphasizing both the feelings of inferiority 
of African Americans and the feelings of resentment of non-African 
Americans. 
In Parents Involved, Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts take a new tack 
regarding Brown.  It’s one thing to say that the Constitution is color-blind—
that’s what Thomas has been saying up to now.  It’s quite another thing to say 
that Brown says the Constitution is color-blind—yet Chief Justice Roberts’s 
plurality opinion in Parents Involved insinuates precisely that: “It was not the 
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the 
basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 
1954.”43  Similarly, Thomas now rewrites Brown, implying that it did reflect 
the color-blind principle as against the anti-caste principle.  He asserts that his 
view of the color-blind Constitution “was the rallying cry for the lawyers who 
litigated Brown,”44 even relating an anecdote about Thurgood Marshall, during 
his most depressed moments, turning to his “Bible,” Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Plessy.45  But there can be no doubt that Marshall himself held the anti-caste 
conception and viewed Harlan’s dissent as expressing the anti-caste 
conception.46 
Thomas also asserts that Breyer’s dissent, though ostensibly invoking an 
anti-caste conception of equal protection,47 “replicates” the arguments made by 
“[t]he segregationists in Brown . . . to a distressing extent,” and that “Brown 
decisively rejected those arguments.”48  What is more, Thomas now resurrects 
Plessy, tarring Justice Breyer’s dissent with its brush.  Thomas asserts that 
Breyer’s view—”pin[ning] its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to 
current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely 
practical consequences, and reliance on previous statements from this and 
other courts”—“first appeared in Plessy, where the Court asked whether a state 
law providing for segregated railway cars was ‘a reasonable regulation.’”49 
In fact, though, Thomas himself resurrects Plessy’s view of the world in 
his concurrence in Parents Involved.  One, he denies that in the field of 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2767 (2007). 
 44. Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 2783. 
 46. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 392–93 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 47. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896)). 
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education, separate is inherently unequal.  Where Breyer sees racial 
segregation,50 Thomas sees only “[r]acial imbalance,” and claims that “[r]acial 
imbalance is not segregation.”51  Thomas states that “racial imbalance can also 
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary 
housing choices.”52  He surely would view these voluntary housing choices 
about where to live as a product of freedom of association (remember Herbert 
Wechsler’s critique of Brown53). 
Furthermore, Thomas disputes Breyer’s argument that integration 
improves educational outcomes for black children, stating: “In reality, it is far 
from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much 
less that integration is necessary to black achievement.”54  Thomas here is 
unwittingly paraphrasing Plessy’s infamous passage: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the . . . separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found 
in the [separation], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.55 
For, on Thomas’s view, many African Americans attending predominantly 
black schools have succumbed to feelings of inferiority, victimhood, and 
entitlement.56  That is because they—aided and abetted by proponents of 
integration and affirmative action—have mistakenly chosen to put that 
construction upon it.  They should instead, according to Thomas, take pride in 
the accomplishments of the students from these predominantly black schools.57  
And, they should work hard and succeed rather than whining about being a 
victim of racism.  Furthermore, on Thomas’s view, Justice Breyer and white 
progressives are engaging in “[r]acial paternalism” and insult by assuming that 
the predominantly black schools are inferior.58  Indeed, Thomas views them as 
patronizing and demeaning to blacks who have succeeded in such schools.  
This sounds a lot like a “de facto” version of “separate but equal” for our 
time.59 
 
 50. Id. at 2801–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 52. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769. 
 53. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 34 (1959). 
 54. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 56. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2775–79 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the 
achievement of black students in predominantly black schools). 
 57. Id. at 2777–78. 
 58. Id. at 2775. 
 59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] REWRITING BROWN, RESURRECTING PLESSY 1149 
Two, Thomas disputes Breyer’s argument that integration in education 
benefits democracy, either by reflecting the “pluralistic society in which our 
children will live” or by “teaching children to engage in the kind of 
cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of 
three hundred million people one Nation.”60  Thomas writes: “[I]t is unclear 
whether increased interracial contact improves racial attitudes and relations.”61  
In Thomas’s words, I hear echoes of Plessy: 
We cannot accept this proposition . . . that social prejudices may be overcome 
by [governmental action].  . . . If the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of 
each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.62 
It seems to me that, ironically, Thomas is not only rewriting Brown and 
resurrecting Plessy, but perhaps even rewriting Brown as resurrecting Plessy!  
For hereafter, Brown is to be interpreted through a worldview analogous to that 
of Plessy. 
III.  WHAT COOPER SAID—AND SHOULD HAVE SAID—COULD EDWIN MEESE 
BE RIGHT THIS TIME? 
In an event whose occasion is the 50th anniversary of Cooper v. Aaron, 
and whose keynote speaker is David Strauss, our leading theorist of common 
law constitutional interpretation, I would be remiss if I did not say something 
about Cooper in relation to common law constitutional interpretation.  Cooper 
proclaims that the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of 
the United States Constitution for the federal system: “the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”63  In recent years, 
many discussions of Cooper have focused on this pronouncement, and what 
Cooper entails for “judicial supremacy.”64 
My focus will be different.  We should distinguish between two 
fundamental interrogatives of constitutional interpretation that are at issue in 
Cooper:65 What is the Constitution? and Who may authoritatively interpret it?  
When people talk about the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper in terms of 
 
 60. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). 
 61. Id. at 2780–81 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 62. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 63. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 64. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
 65. For works that conceptualize the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of 
not only these two interrogatives but also a third—How ought we to interpret the Constitution?, 
see JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 
71–72 (2006); WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & STEPHEN 
MACEDO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (4th ed. 2008). 
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judicial supremacy, they are talking about Cooper’s answer to the “Who” 
interrogative: the Court’s anointment of itself as the ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution.  Consider, for example, several other papers in this symposium.66 
But I want to talk about Cooper’s answer to the “What” interrogative.  In 
Cooper, the Supreme Court practically equates the Constitution itself with 
what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution.  The reasoning proceeds 
by syllogism.  Major premise: “Article 6 of the Constitution makes the 
Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’”67  Minor premise: Marbury 
declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”68  Conclusion: “It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the 
Brown Case is the supreme law of the land.”69  Put another way, the Court 
practically obliterates the distinction between the Constitution itself and 
constitutional law.  In doing so, as former Attorney General Edwin Meese 
famously objected, “the Court seemed to reduce the Constitution [, our 
fundamental and paramount law,] to the status of ordinary constitutional law, 
and to equate the judge with the lawgiver.”70 
What turns on this distinction between the Constitution itself and 
constitutional law?  Nothing less than whether we can criticize the Supreme 
Court’s decisions as erroneous interpretations of the Constitution.  As Meese 
puts it, “to confuse the Constitution with judicial pronouncements allows no 
standard by which to criticize and seek the overruling of what University of 
Chicago Law Professor Philip Kurland once called the ‘derelicts of 
constitutional law’—cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson.”71  It 
pains me to acknowledge that Meese might ever have been right about 
anything, but I must say it: Meese was right this time.72  And let’s observe a 
splendid irony: Meese is saying that the implication of Cooper, the case that 
reaffirmed Brown, is that we cannot criticize Plessy as wrongly decided. 
I want to generalize Meese’s criticism of Cooper and frame it as a 
challenge to common law constitutional interpretation.  For Cooper, in its 
equation of the Constitution itself with constitutional law, may seem to be a 
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 69. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
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canonical expression of common law constitutional interpretation.  And 
therefore, one of the challenges for common law constitutional interpretation is 
to articulate a criterion for criticizing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
the Constitution on the ground that they have misinterpreted the Constitution. 
To generalize, any adequate theory of constitutional interpretation needs a 
criterion for distinguishing the Constitution itself from constitutional law.  
Originalism in all of its varieties readily provides such a criterion: original 
meaning of the Constitution may trump judicial doctrine of constitutional law 
at any time.73  Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution,74 and 
Sotirios A. Barber’s and my philosophic approach to constitutional 
interpretation,75 also readily provide such a criterion: we can always criticize 
judicial doctrine from the standpoint of the moral and political theory that 
provides the best justification of the Constitution. 
What about common law constitutional interpretation?  Does it provide a 
criterion for distinguishing the Constitution from constitutional law?  Does it 
provide a standpoint from which to criticize the “derelicts of constitutional 
law” like Plessy?  And from which to justify Brown?  Indeed, from which to 
criticize the work of the Roberts Court? 
In pondering this question, we should distinguish several varieties of 
common law constitutional interpretation: (1) ipse dixit common law 
constitutional interpretation; (2) doctrinalist common law constitutional 
interpretation; (3) Strauss’s “rational traditionalist” common law constitutional 
interpretation; and (4) moral reading common law constitutional interpretation.  
I’ll sketch each as I go along. 
Needless to say, an ipse dixit common law constitutionalism could justify 
Brown in a manner of speaking: it would simply say, the Constitution equals 
what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution, and since the Supreme 
Court itself decided Brown, the decision is justified ipse dixit.  That would 
hardly be a satisfactory account. 
What do I mean by doctrinalist common law constitutional interpretation?  
This would be the view that one can avoid making moral and philosophic 
arguments and judgments in constitutional interpretation if we simply develop 
and apply doctrine, deciding one case at a time through the common law 
method.  Perhaps Herbert Wechsler was in the grip of such a conception.  
Perhaps that is one reason why he thought Brown was not justifiable, and why 
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it violated the commitment to neutral principles.76  In fact, far from being weak 
on principle, Brown’s strong suit is principle, its commitment to an anti-caste 
principle of equal citizenship.  Strauss has put this very well in his lecture.77  In 
any case, Barber and I have criticized a doctrinalist common law approach in 
our new book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions.78  We have 
shown that it cannot avoid the moral and philosophic choices that it aims and 
claims to avoid. 
Also, needless to say, a theory of common law constitutional interpretation 
that incorporates the moral reading of the Constitution could justify Brown; it 
would say that the anti-caste principle of equal citizenship manifested in 
Brown is the best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, and that 
Plessy’s view that “separate but equal” does not deny equal protection is 
mistaken.79 
Now, Strauss presumably would say that a “rational traditionalist” theory 
of common law constitutional interpretation like his own80 also can criticize 
Plessy and justify Brown, but it is a little harder to articulate why.  He certainly 
allows moral insights and judgments into common law constitutional 
interpretation,81 but it is less clear how he can do so (and how he does so) than 
it is, say, with Dworkin’s moral reading or Barber’s and my philosophic 
approach.  And so, we should ask whether a moral reading is really doing the 
work here in criticizing Plessy and justifying Brown, not a version of common 
law constitutional interpretation that is an alternative to the moral reading.  I 
propose this as a friendly amendment to Strauss’s theory of common law 
constitutional interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
I want to thank David Strauss for his wise and profound remarks about 
Cooper and the legacy of Brown, in particular about how conservatives are 
radically recasting the meaning and legacy of Brown.  We must step up our 
efforts in this vein, lest the conservatives of the Roberts Court ironically 
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